COMING NEXT WEEK
Local political science scholars shed light on ISIS, the threat the jihadist group poses to Iraqis and international security, and what they ultimately want.
As the ISIS militant army continued its surge in Iraq, the United States this week found its forces drawn back into violence in a nation we thought we’d left after a decade of combat. Our involvement has been limited so far, but it has spawned plenty of commentary about how we got here, how the U.S. may have contributed to the current crisis, and what can or should be done about it now. Today, we offer a variety of viewpoints from around the world on this continuing story.
FROM THE LEFT: Britain, U.S., might strengthen ISIS by attacking
From Seumas Milne, in the U.K. Guardian: They couldn't keep away. Barely two years after U.S. forces were withdrawn from Iraq, they're back in action. Barack Obama has now become the fourth U.S. president in a row to launch military action in Iraq.
We’re now into … U.S. air attacks on the self-styled Islamic State, formerly known as ISIS — the sectarian fundamentalists who have taken over vast tracts of Sunni Iraq and are carrying out vicious ethnic cleansing against minorities in the north.
The media and political drumbeat is growing louder for Britain to move from humanitarian aid drops to join the military campaign. France has announced it will be arming Iraqi Kurdish forces. There are already 800 U.S. troops back on Iraqi territory. …
If ever there was a case for another Anglo-American bombing campaign, some say, this must surely be it. Graphic reports of the suffering of tens of thousands of Yazidi refugees on Mount Sinjar and the horrific violence that has driven the Christians of Qaraqosh from their homes have aroused global sympathy.
The victims of this sectarian onslaught need urgent humanitarian aid and refuge. But the idea that the states that invaded and largely destroyed Iraq at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives should claim the cause of humanitarianism for yet another military intervention in Iraq beggars belief. …
The U.S. is back in Iraq for the long haul, the president signalled, spelling out that his aim is to prevent IS establishing “some sort of caliphate through Syria and Iraq” – which is exactly what the group regards itself as having done.
The danger of the U.S., Britain and others being drawn again into the morass of a disintegrating state they themselves took apart is obvious. IS, then known as al-Qaida in Iraq, itself effectively arrived in the country in 2003 on the backs of U.S. and British tanks.
The idea that the states responsible for at least 500,000 deaths, 4 million refugees, mass torture and ethnic cleansing in Iraq over the past decade should now present themselves as having a “responsibility to protect” Iraqis verges on satire.
The majority of Iraq’s million-strong Christian community was in fact forced out of the country under US-British occupation. The state sectarianism that triggered the Sunni revolt and rise of IS in Iraq – the ultimate blowback – was built into the political structures set up by George Bush.
Britain and the U.S. — which didn’t want to “take sides” when Egypt’s coup leaders carried out one of the largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in history last summer — are the last countries on Earth to bring humanitarian relief to Iraq.
That doesn’t mean that they don’t have a responsibility to provide aid. But the record of western humanitarian intervention over the past two decades isn’t a happy one. In 1991, no-fly zones in Iraq allowed massacres of Shia rebels in the south and only functioned with thousands of troops on the ground in Kurdistan, followed by 12 years of bombing raids.
In 1999, NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo, also without UN authorization, triggered a massive increase in the ethnic cleansing it was meant to halt. In Libya, in 2011, NATO’s intervention ratcheted up the death toll by a factor of about 10 and gave cover for rampant ethnic cleansing and indiscriminate killing. Its legacy today is complete state breakdown and civil war.
It might be said that the latest US bombing campaign in Iraq has greater legitimacy because the Iraqi government appealed for support. But it did so back in June, after which Obama stayed his hand until the prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, could be replaced with someone more acceptable to the U.S. …
But another round of U.S. and British military intervention would only strengthen IS and boost its credibility – as well as increase the risk of terror attacks at home. The likelihood is that it can only be overcome by a functioning state in both Iraq and Syria. That in turn demands a decisive break with the sectarian and ethnic politics bequeathed by a decade of war and intervention.
The urge to play the role of self-appointed global policeman retains its grip on the western world, but experience shows that will do nothing to rescue the people of Iraq. Far more important would be agreement between the regional powers, including Turkey and Iran, on a settlement to allow Iraq to escape from its existential crisis.
FROM THE RIGHT: Does Obama’s withdrawal deserve blame for current state?
From James Taranto, in the Wall Street Journal: At a Saturday press conference, a reporter asked President Obama a question that's been on our mind since Obama announced a new U.S. military intervention in Iraq: "Mr. President, do you have any second thoughts about pulling all ground troops out of Iraq? And does it give you pause as the U.S. — is it doing the same thing in Afghanistan?"
“What I just find interesting is the degree to which this issue keeps on coming up, as if this was my decision,” Obama replied. “Under the previous administration, we had turned over the country to a sovereign, democratically elected Iraqi government.”
Yes, Obama is not only disclaiming responsibility for the troop pullout but blaming it on George W. Bush — among others, as we shall see, but “the previous administration” is the first target of his pointed finger.
Of course Obama is correct that the disposition of the U.S. troop presence was not solely “my decision.” With Iraqi sovereignty restored, Washington and Baghdad would both have to consent to a status-of-forces agreement, or SOFA. In the president’s telling, the Iraqis balked at signing a SOFA unless the U.S. agreed to unacceptable conditions.
“We needed assurances that our personnel would be immune from prosecution if, for example, they were protecting themselves and ended up getting in a firefight with Iraqis, that they wouldn’t be hauled before an Iraqi judicial system,” the president said. The Iraqis rejected that demand. “So let’s just be clear: The reason that we did not have a follow-on force in Iraq was because … a majority of Iraqis did not want U.S. troops there, and politically they could not pass the kind of laws that would be required to protect our troops in Iraq.”
In an April story for The New Yorker, Dexter Filkins painted a more complicated picture. U.S. military commanders told Filkins that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki “said that he wanted to keep (U.S.) troops in Iraq,” but that “parliament would forbid the troops to stay unless they were subject to local law.” But “President Obama, too, was ambivalent about retaining even a small force in Iraq.” …
This account is consistent with Obama’s inasmuch as the Iraqis were making what the Americans regarded as an unreasonable demand. But it also suggests that Obama was eager for a complete pullout and thus happy to see the talks fail.
FROM THE LEFT: The deterioration of Iraq was always inevitable.
From Bruce Fein, in the Baltimore Sun: …Iraq is an artificial state carved out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. It is destined to splinter into three: a Kurdish state in the north, a Sunni state in the center and a Shiite state in the south. The United States can do nothing to alter this inevitability. A partitioned Iraq, however, will be preoccupied with domestic concerns unthreatening to the United States or Israel.
The pointlessness of a United States military intervention in Iraq would be compounded by the troublesome precedent that could be invoked to crush democracy. A Russian military intervention in Ukraine would be justified in order to restore ousted President Viktor Yanukovich. China could be justified in sending troops to Burma to prevent the ascendancy to the presidency of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.
In sum, the optimal (and legal) policy of the United States toward Iraq at present is active watching. Getting involved yet again is illegal and will only make things worse.
FROM THE CENTER: The U.S. lacks the ability to change the game now.
From Nada Bakos and Tara Maller, at CNN.com: Over the past few days, politicians and experts have been debating the merits of the Obama administration's strategy in Iraq — or whether there is in fact a strategy.
The debate generally ignores a key underlying fact: The United States no longer has the ability or the will to shape the outcome in Iraq to the degree that American policy makers would like.
At the same time, politicians on both sides of the aisle appear constrained in their ability to talk candidly about U.S. foreign policy objectives and strategy because of concerns about domestic public opinion and so they often default to partisan sound bites.
In an ideal world, U.S. strategy would be carefully calibrated and aimed at a number of political, military and economic goals for the country and the region.
Yet the dynamics of the U.S. relationship with Iraq is similar to most dysfunctional relationships in which problematic patterns repeat and persist over time.
One party may in fact be able to change the entrenched dysfunctional behavior of another person at the margins, but at the end of the day, countries — as do people — need to take responsibility for their behavior, their mistakes and their future.
How religion could complicate U.S. intervention in Iraq
Unfortunately, the reality is that after more than 10 years of trying to shape outcomes in Iraq, the United States is forced to acknowledge it doesn’t have the leverage we expected. The next best option is to find a solution that encompasses our values but doesn’t err on the side of unrealistic idealism.
America’s greatest failure has perhaps been our unwavering belief that we are always able to positively influence and shape the behavior of others through rhetoric, coercion, force and diplomacy. Leverage, as the United States has historically defined it, is not as relevant in today’s conflicts. However, the conditions are not ripe for the United States to pull Iraq out of this quagmire given the lack of interest in America after over a decade of war and the political gridlock here and in Iraq.
In our time as analysts at the CIA, we were asked to present the opposite of what political punditry and partisan speeches tend to do. We were often asked to outline worst-case scenarios, speak truth to power and accurately assess dynamics on the ground. We were not supposed to sugarcoat our analysis to make it more palatable or to cater to the audience with empty words or false optimism. We were trained to try to objectively assess and analyze the veracity of reporting to help inform policymakers’ decisions.
So, while it may not be politically popular for a leader or a president to say that “we can’t influence longer-term outcomes to the degree that we’d like in Iraq, so we are adopting a strategy to avert worst-case scenarios and contain catastrophe,” this is precisely the strategy we believe ought to be adopted right now.
We need an honest strategy based on containing catastrophe. In other words, our strategy at this point ought to be designed to thwart the worst outcomes from occurring and it should focus on preventing moral, humanitarian and security catastrophes.
The United States can make a significant difference in the lives of Iraqis and in the realm of our own national security even if the future of Iraq ultimately rests in hands of Iraqis. …
A foreign policy strategy speech predicated on containing catastrophe might not be a speech that inspires the American public, but it is an honest strategy that would be based on a realistic approach to our foreign policy in Iraq.
Such an approach is good for America’s national security and for addressing the humanitarian concerns of those suffering during crisis.
FROM THE RIGHT: This is war, and the U.S. should get back in to win it.
From Bing West, in the National Review: By pulling our forces out of Iraq in 2011, Mr. Obama claimed, he "ended the war." Three years later, the winner of that war is a barbarous Islamist army that has seized the northern half of Iraq, threatening both Kurdistan and Baghdad. An alarmed Iraqi parliament has just elected a new prime minister, opening the door for American assistance.
So what should we do? The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Martin Dempsey, has suggested that we “initially contain, eventually disrupt, and finally defeat (the Islamists) over time.” Notice that the general used the word “defeat.”
What is necessary to put flesh on Dempsey’s objectives? First, both parties in Congress must agree that this Islamist army is a mortal threat to America’s core values and must be destroyed. General James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, has testified that ISIL, or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, poses a potential threat to the homeland. The phrase “potential threat” is fraught with ambiguity. Until catastrophe occurs, many will argue that ISIL is a murderous religious cult confined within regional geographic boundaries. That was how Mr. Clinton viewed Osama bin Laden before 9/11. If the commander-in-chief does not perceive a mortal threat and if the press grossly underreports the persecution of Christians and other minorities, then the public will see no reason for our military to become heavily involved.
With the Obama administration, nothing is ever what it was or may be in the future. There is no constancy.
We have to get serious about this: Does the U.S. view the Islamist army as a threat that must be destroyed by American force of arms, or not?
To contain, disrupt, and defeat ISIL, our policymakers and generals must view themselves as virtual warriors. War is the act of killing until the enemy is defeated.
Four years ago, the White House changed the goal from “defeat” to “degrade” the Taliban. That rightly drove a gap between our troops and the high command. Our resolute warriors were dying for an objective that irresolute generals and policymakers couldn’t define. In his memoir, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote that “the president’s heart wasn’t in the mission.” In place of a goal, Mr. Obama pledged a date; before he left office in 2016, the last American soldier would leave Afghanistan. Whatever happened to defeating the enemy?
As war author Karl Marlantes has written, don’t treat a human life as a bargaining chip, unless you are willing to be that chip. Too many policymakers and generals think of violence, if they think of it at all, as a negotiating tool.
“The enemy gets a vote,” said a senior defense official. “If they stop, we stop. If they attack we bring down the hammer.”
The public will be supportive if — and only if — our political and military leadership display the warrior resolve to destroy the Islamist army. If you go to war, kill the opponent. Crush his body and spirit until he is destroyed or submits to your goals.
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