Report blames procedural, supervisory failures for 2024 death of airman in Alaska

This photo provided by the U.S. Air Force shows a U.S. Air Force pilot taking off in an F-22 Raptor at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Va., Saturday, Feb. 4, 2023. At the direction President Joe Biden, military aircraft brought down a high altitude surveillance balloon off the coast of South Carolina. (Airman 1st Class Mikaela Smith/U.S. Air Force via AP)

Credit: AP

Credit: AP

This photo provided by the U.S. Air Force shows a U.S. Air Force pilot taking off in an F-22 Raptor at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Va., Saturday, Feb. 4, 2023. At the direction President Joe Biden, military aircraft brought down a high altitude surveillance balloon off the coast of South Carolina. (Airman 1st Class Mikaela Smith/U.S. Air Force via AP)

An airman in Alaska died of head injuries while working on an F-22A Raptor last year due in part to the maintenance team’s failure to follow procedures and a lack of adequate supervision, according to an Air Force report released Monday.

Staff Sgt. Charles Crumlett, 25, was killed March 15, 2024, while working as part of a six-member maintenance team with the 90th Fighter Generation Squadron at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, according to the 32-page report by the Air Force Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

Crumlett, of Streamwood, Ill., had been with the squadron only a month and had completed only academic training on Raptor maintenance, the investigation states.

Required maintenance on the jet included extending and retracting configurable rail launchers, which move in and out of the jet’s right and left weapons bays.

The launchers are configured for the use of different types of missiles or rockets.

The standard maintenance practice on the launchers is to use a computerized maintenance aid, which is basically a ruggedized laptop that provides digitalized technical data, diagnostics and repair guidance directly to the mechanic.

In this case, the maintainer should have been operating the launchers via the maintenance aid while having eyes directly on it, the investigation states.

“In contravention of standard practice, the multi-functional display (MFD) in the cockpit was used to actuate the desired functions,” the investigation states.

“There is no line-of-sight between the cockpit ladder and the right-side weapons bay, and the maintenance team chief retracted the [configurable rail launcher] when all personnel were not clear; [Crumlett] was in the bay and his head was impinged between the plume deflector and the bulkhead, causing fatal head trauma.”

The investigation concluded the mishap resulted from a “failure to follow prescribed procedures” and “failure to maintain awareness and supervisory direction.”

Three additional factors substantially contributed to the accident: the maintenance team was performing multiple tasks simultaneously; had not developed proficiency, in part because three members were in training; and possessed a “false sense of security” regarding the launcher rail and weapons bay because of a misunderstanding about the function of a safety switch.

The maintenance team lacked a clear idea of who was leading the launcher maintenance tasks, the investigation found.

“This created confusion about who was performing what task at what time,” the report states.

Verbal communication was difficult because of noise coming from an auxiliary power unit. Maintainers wore double ear protection and at times used hand signals.

During the launcher task, a thumbs-up signal from one of the maintainers was misinterpreted as an all-clear in the weapons bay when Crumlett was still inside, the investigation found.

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